A radio jet drives a molecular and atomic gas outflow in multiple regions within one square kiloparsec of the nucleus of the nearby galaxy IC5063

We analyzed near-infrared data of the nearby galaxy IC5063 taken with the Very Large Telescope SINFONI instrument. IC5063 is an elliptical galaxy that has a radio jet nearly aligned with the major axis of a gas disk in its center. The data reveal multiple signatures of molecular and atomic gas that has been kinematically distorted by the passage of the jet plasma or cocoon within an area of ~1 kpc^2. Concrete evidence that the interaction of the jet with the gas causes the gas to accelerate comes from the detection of outflows in four different regions along the jet trail: near the two radio lobes, between the radio emission tip and the optical narrow-line-region cone, and at a region with diffuse 17.8 GHz emission midway between the nucleus and the north radio lobe. The outflow in the latter region is biconical, centered 240 pc away from the nucleus, and oriented perpendicularly to the jet trail. The diffuse emission that is observed as a result of the gas entrainment or scattering unfolds around the trail and away from the nucleus with increasing velocity. It overall extends for >700 pc parallel and perpendicular to the trail. Near the outflow starting points, the gas has a velocity excess of 600 km/s to 1200 km/s with respect to ordered motions, as seen in [FeII], Pa alpha, or H2 lines. High H2 (1-0) S(3)/S(1) flux ratios indicate non-thermal excitation of gas in the diffuse outflow.Comment: Accepted for publication in Ap

Relativistic Disk Reflection in the Neutron Star X-ray Binary XTE J1709-267 with NuSTAR

We perform the first reflection study of the soft X-ray transient and Type 1 burst source XTE J1709-267 using NuSTAR observations during its 2016 June outburst. There was an increase in flux near the end of the observations, which corresponds to an increase from $\sim$0.04 L$_{\mathrm{Edd}}$ to $\sim$0.06 L$_{\mathrm{Edd}}$ assuming a distance of 8.5 kpc. We have separately examined spectra from the low and high flux intervals, which were soft and show evidence of a broad Fe K line. Fits to these intervals with relativistic disk reflection models have revealed an inner disk radius of $13.8_{-1.8}^{+3.0}\ R_{g}$ (where $R_{g} = GM/c^{2}$) for the low flux spectrum and $23.4_{-5.4}^{+15.6}\ R_{g}$ for the high flux spectrum at the 90\% confidence level. The disk is likely truncated by a boundary layer surrounding the neutron star or the magnetosphere. Based on the measured luminosity and using the accretion efficiency for a disk around a neutron star, we estimate that the theoretically expected size for the boundary layer would be $\sim0.9-1.1 \ R_{g}$ from the neutron star's surface, which can be increased by spin or viscosity effects. Another plausible scenario is that the disk could be truncated by the magnetosphere. We place a conservative upper limit on the strength of the magnetic field at the poles, assuming $a_{*}=0$ and $M_{NS}=1.4\ M_{\odot}$, of $B\leq0.75-3.70\times10^{9}$ G, though X-ray pulsations have not been detected from this source.Comment: Accepted for publication in ApJ, 5 pages, 4 figures, 1 table. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1701.0177

Prediction and explanation in the multiverse

Probabilities in the multiverse can be calculated by assuming that we are typical representatives in a given reference class. But is this class well defined? What should be included in the ensemble in which we are supposed to be typical? There is a widespread belief that this question is inherently vague, and that there are various possible choices for the types of reference objects which should be counted in. Here we argue that the ``ideal'' reference class (for the purpose of making predictions) can be defined unambiguously in a rather precise way, as the set of all observers with identical information content. When the observers in a given class perform an experiment, the class branches into subclasses who learn different information from the outcome of that experiment. The probabilities for the different outcomes are defined as the relative numbers of observers in each subclass. For practical purposes, wider reference classes can be used, where we trace over all information which is uncorrelated to the outcome of the experiment, or whose correlation with it is beyond our current understanding. We argue that, once we have gathered all practically available evidence, the optimal strategy for making predictions is to consider ourselves typical in any reference class we belong to, unless we have evidence to the contrary. In the latter case, the class must be correspondingly narrowed.Comment: Minor clarifications adde

Anthropic reasoning in multiverse cosmology and string theory

Anthropic arguments in multiverse cosmology and string theory rely on the weak anthropic principle (WAP). We show that the principle, though ultimately a tautology, is nevertheless ambiguous. It can be reformulated in one of two unambiguous ways, which we refer to as WAP_1 and WAP_2. We show that WAP_2, the version most commonly used in anthropic reasoning, makes no physical predictions unless supplemented by a further assumption of "typicality", and we argue that this assumption is both misguided and unjustified. WAP_1, however, requires no such supplementation; it directly implies that any theory that assigns a non-zero probability to our universe predicts that we will observe our universe with probability one. We argue, therefore, that WAP_1 is preferable, and note that it has the benefit of avoiding the inductive overreach characteristic of much anthropic reasoning.Comment: 7 pages. Expanded discussion of selection effects and some minor clarifications, as publishe

Sequential Extensions of Causal and Evidential Decision Theory

Moving beyond the dualistic view in AI where agent and environment are separated incurs new challenges for decision making, as calculation of expected utility is no longer straightforward. The non-dualistic decision theory literature is split between causal decision theory and evidential decision theory. We extend these decision algorithms to the sequential setting where the agent alternates between taking actions and observing their consequences. We find that evidential decision theory has two natural extensions while causal decision theory only has one.Comment: ADT 201

An Infrared Divergence Problem in the cosmological measure theory and the anthropic reasoning

An anthropic principle has made it possible to answer the difficult question of why the observable value of cosmological constant ($\Lambda\sim 10^{-47}$ GeV${}^4$) is so disconcertingly tiny compared to predicted value of vacuum energy density $\rho_{SUSY}\sim 10^{12}$ GeV${}^4$. Unfortunately, there is a darker side to this argument, as it consequently leads to another absurd prediction: that the probability to observe the value $\Lambda=0$ for randomly selected observer exactly equals to 1. We'll call this controversy an infrared divergence problem. It is shown that the IRD prediction can be avoided with the help of a Linde-Vanchurin {\em singular runaway measure} coupled with the calculation of relative Bayesian probabilities by the means of the {\em doomsday argument}. Moreover, it is shown that while the IRD problem occurs for the {\em prediction stage} of value of $\Lambda$, it disappears at the {\em explanatory stage} when $\Lambda$ has already been measured by the observer.Comment: 9 pages, RevTe

AAAI: an Argument Against Artificial Intelligence

The ethical concerns regarding the successful development of an Artificial Intelligence have received a lot of attention lately. The idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of an AI causing extreme human suffering is important enough to warrant serious consideration. Others look at this problem from the opposite perspective, namely that of the AI itself. Here the idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of humanity causing extreme suffering to an AI is important enough to warrant serious consideration. This paper starts from the observation that both concerns rely on problematic philosophical assumptions. Rather than tackling these assumptions directly, it proceeds to present an argument that if one takes these assumptions seriously, then one has a moral obligation to advocate for a ban on the development of a conscious AI

TRANSHUMANISM AND MORAL EQUALITY

Conservative thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama have produced a battery of objections to the transhumanist project of fundamentally enhancing human capacities. This article examines one of these objections, namely that by allowing some to greatly extend their capacities, we will undermine the fundamental moral equality of human beings. I argue that this objection is groundless: once we understand the basis for human equality, it is clear that anyone who now has sufficient capacities to count as a person from the moral point of view will continue to count as one even if others are fundamentally enhanced; and it is mistaken to think that a creature which had even far greater capacities than an unenhanced human being should count as more than an equal from the moral point of view